Tuesday, March 08, 2005

Terrible Sleep and Chomsky Reader (Again)

まともに眠れない。腹立たしい。カウンセリングを始めてから、いろいろ思い出そうとする。もともと、記憶の表面に近いところにある事柄なので、思い出そうとすると大きな努力なしに、すぐにその場面がよみがえる。

"Chomsky Reader"から。

... [M]y basic attitude toward the American war in Vietnam was based on the principle that aggression is wrong, including the aggression of the United States against South Vietnam. There's only a small number of people in American academic circles who could even hear those words. They wouldn’t know what I'm referring to when I talk about American aggression against South Vietnam. There is no such even in official history, though there clearly was in the real world. It seems difficult for elite intellectuals to believe that my opposition to the American attack against South Vietnam was based on the same principle that led me to oppose the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan.... It’s excluded in principle that one could be opposed to the use of force and violence by the United States against South Vietnam, since no such event took place as far as they are concerned and therefore one couldn’t have any interpretation of events based on that fact. According to official history, the United States was defending South Vietnam, not attacking it -- unwisely, the doves maintain. Perhaps there are Soviet doves who criticize "the defense of Afghanistan" in similar terms. (pp. 18-19, Interview)

When Arthur Schlesinger was asked by the New York Times, in November 1965, to explain the contradiction between his published account of the Bay of Pigs incident and the story he had given the press at the time of the attack, he simply remarked that he had lied; and a few days later, he went on to compliment the Times for also having suppressed information on the planned invasion, in "the national interest," as this was defined by the group of arrogant and deluded men of whom Schlesinger gives such a flattering portrait in his recent account of the Kennedy administration. (pp. 60-61, The Responsibility of Intellectuals, 1966)

... "[C]ontainment of Communism" was not a policy invented by George Kennan in 1947. Specifically it was a dominant theme in the diplomacy of the 1930s. In 1934, Lloyd George stated that “in a very short time, perhaps in a year, perhaps two, the conservative elements in this country will be looking to Germany as the bulwark against Communism in Europe.... Do not let us be in a hurry to condemn Germany. We shall be welcoming Germany as "our friend." (p. 116)

... [C]onsider the remarks of Henry Kissinger in concluding his presentation in a Harvard-Oxford television debate on American Vietnam policies. He observed, rather sadly, that what disturbs him most is that others question not our judgment but our motives -- a remarkable comment on the part of one whose professional concern is political analysis, that is, analysis of the actions of government in terms of motives that are unexpressed in official propaganda and perhaps only dimly perceived by those whose acts they govern. (p. 64, The Responsibility of Intellectuals, 1966)

Nothing could reveal more clearly the dangers inherent in the "new society" than the role that McNamara's Pentagon has played for the past half dozen years. No doubt McNamara succeeded in doing with utmost efficiency that which should not be done at all. No doubt he has shown an unparalleled mastery of the logistics of coercion and repression, combined with the most astonishing inability to comprehend political and human factors. (p. 120, Objectivity and Liberal Scholarship, 1968)

As for social rewards, it is alleged that in our society remuneration correlates in part with IQ. But insofar as that is true, it is simply a social malady to overcome much as slavery had to be eliminated at an earlier stage of human history. It is sometimes argued that constructive and creative work will cease unless it leads to material reward, so that all of society gains when the talented receive special rewards. For the mass of the population, then the message is: "You're better off if you're poor." One can see why this doctrine would appeal to the privileged, but it is difficult to believe that it could be put forth seriously by anyone who has had experience with creative work or workers in the arts, the sciences, crafts, or whatever. The standard arguments for "meritocracy" have no basis in fact or logic, to my knowledge; they rest on a priori beliefs, which, furthermore, do not seem particularly plausible. (p. 199, Equality, Language Development, Human Intelligence, and Social Organization, 1976)

Consider finally the question of race and intellectual endowments. Notice again that in a decent society there would be no social consequences to any discovery that might be made about this question. Individuals are what they are; it is only on racist assumptions that they are to be regarded as an instance of their race category, so that social consequences ensue from the discovery that the mean for a certain racial category with respect to some capacity is such and such. Eliminating racist assumptions, the facts that have no social consequence whatever the may be, and are therefore not worth knowing, from this point of view at least.... In a racist society, inquiry into race and IQ can be expected to reinforce prejudice, pretty much independent of the outcome of the inquiry. Given such concepts as "race" and "IQ," it is to be expected that the results of any inquiry will be obscure and conflicting, the arguments complex are difficult for the laymen to follow. For the racist, the judgment "Not proven" will be read, "Probably so." (pp. 199-200, Equality, Language Development, Human Intelligence, and Social Organization, 1976)

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