"Patriotism Is Not a Crime!": Protesters

A collision in East Asia
Apr 14th 2005
From The Economist print edition

There should be no enlarged Security Council without Japan

YOU can be sure that a march of 10,000 protesters through the heart of Beijing would have been halted by China's security services if they had been marching for democracy. Since they were marching instead to denounce Japan, for its supposed failure to apologise for historical crimes, and for its temerity in seeking permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, China's authorities allowed the demonstration to go ahead, with predictable results (see article). Japanese shops were ransacked and Japan's embassy pelted with eggs and stones. The protests, which had started in Chengdu a week earlier, spread to other cities, including Shenzhen and Guangzhou in the prosperous south.

For anyone who had taken the view that the present proposals to reform the United Nations and change the architecture of the Security Council were just a parlour game for diplomats, these demonstrations mark a rude awakening. All of the council's permanent five—America, Britain, China, France and Russia—guard their seats at the top table jealously and are wary about the prospect of this honour being diluted. Some, it is now plain, are willing to whip up the emotions of their people to resist unwanted newcomers. And when it comes to China and Japan, those emotions are still remarkably raw.

It is not much of an exaggeration to say that these two Asian giants are scarcely any better reconciled than they were in 1972, when they established diplomatic relations. This is true in spite of an economic relationship that has grown increasingly intimate. In most years, China and Japan are nowadays each other's biggest trading partner. Some 16,000 Japanese firms do business on the Chinese mainland: Japan's technology and China's low-paid workers make a natural and mutually advantageous fit. In culture and consumption, too, the two countries are growing closer: younger Chinese admire Japanese boy-bands, older ones relish buying reliable Japanese cars and applying Japanese cosmetics.

In politics, however, the story is quite different. The mighty neighbours are competing for natural resources and squabbling over the sovereignty of tiny islands. In service of its present interests, China endlessly drags up the legacy of the past, taking the view that Japan has never apologised properly for its brutal behaviour in China during the second world war and before. No Chinese president has visited Japan since 1998, and Japan's prime minister has not been to China since 2001.

If anything, relations have in fact grown worse. In previous decades the wounds of war were no less deep but the neighbours enjoyed a sort of understanding about their respective places in the world. China was a heavyweight in geopolitics but an economic weakling. Japan was the opposite: an economic superpower, barred by its own constitution and historical guilt from playing any significant role in world affairs. But this division of labelling has been breaking down.

China is on the way to becoming an economic superpower: today it is China and no longer Japan that runs the world's biggest trade surplus with the United States. And Japan, which still has the world's second-largest economy, is no longer willing to be a second-class citizen in diplomacy. As a populous and rich democracy, a big contributor of foreign aid, the second-biggest contributor after America to the United Nations, and (within the limits imposed by its post-war constitution, which it has been flexible in reinterpreting) an increasingly active international peacekeeper, it believes it deserves a permanent seat in any enlarged Security Council.

And it is right. The UN's current archaic system gives permanent seats, and vetoes, to five countries and condemns everyone else, no matter how regionally powerful or active in international security, to an occasional two-year term. If permanent membership of the council is to be enlarged, as Kofi Annan, the UN's secretary-general, says he would like it to be, Japan (along with India and Brazil) is a natural candidate by dint of population, standing and economic power. Germany has a strong case, too, though one complicated by the fact that the European Union would then have three permanent members. A case can also be made for a large African country such as South Africa or Nigeria, and perhaps an Arab one, such as Egypt. But what is absolutely plain is that to add India, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa or Egypt but to exclude Japan would not only constitute an egregious insult to the Japanese but also make a nonsense of the whole exercise.

Don't call the whole thing off

In which case, should the exercise be abandoned? That might be convenient to some. Countries such as Italy and Pakistan, dismayed by the prospect of neighbours and rivals taking places at the top table, are already complaining. Although America pays lip service to enlargement, it might welcome an excuse to stick with the present system—and China's exclusion of Japan would certainly provide one. But what a pity that would be. The UN system will never be perfect, but it can be improved to reflect the world more as it is today, not as it was at the end of the second world war more than half a century ago. The Japanese belong in an enlarged Security Council—not least so the Chinese come to understand that they cannot have everything their way in East Asia's future.

The China question
Apr 21st 2005
From The Economist print edition

Asia's real boat-rocker is a growing and undemocratic China, not democratic Japan

THERE is so much noise surrounding and emanating from the world's miracle economy that it is becoming cacophonous. In Washington, DC, the latest idea is that China is becoming too successful, perhaps even dangerously so: while Capitol Hill resounds with complaints of trade surpluses and currency manipulation, the Pentagon and sundry think-tanks echo to a new drumbeat of analysts worrying about China's 12.6% annual rise in military spending and about whether it might soon have the ability to take pre-emptive military action to force Taiwan to rejoin it. So it may be no coincidence that for three consecutive weekends the streets of big Chinese cities have been filled with the sounds of demonstrators marching and rocks being thrown, all seeking to send a different message: that Japan is the problem in Asia, not China, because of its wanton failure to face up to its history; and that by cosying up to Japan in security matters, America is allying with Asia's pariah.

Deafness is not the only risk from all this noise. The pressure towards protectionism in Washington is strong (see article), and could put in further danger not only trade with China but also the wider climate for trade liberalisation in the Doha round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). So far words have been the main weapons used between China and Japan, but there is a chance that nationalism in either or both countries could lead the governments to strike confrontational poses over their territorial disputes in the seas that divide them, even involving their navies. And the more that nationalist positions become entrenched in both countries but especially China, the more that street protests could become stirred up, perhaps towards more violence.

All these issues are complex ones and, as is often the case in trade and in historical disputes, finding solutions is likely to be far from simple. A revaluation of the yuan, as demanded in Congress, would not re-balance trade between America and China, though it might help a little, in due course. A “sincere” apology by Japan for its wartime atrocities might also help a little, but it would not suddenly turn Asia's natural great-power rivals into bosom buddies. For behind all the noise lies one big fact: that it is the rise of China, not the status or conduct of Japan, that poses Asia's thorniest questions.

Echoes of the 1930s

But doesn't Japan have much to apologise for? And hasn't it failed to match Germany's postwar blend of contrition and compensation? Yes, it does have a lot to apologise for, and yes, it has failed to do as much as Germany. But it would not take all that much to remedy those faults.

Japan has apologised countless times to China as to its other Asian victims, using all the right words. Its problem is that it has undermined those apologies in three main ways: by forcing recipient governments to negotiate over the phraseology to be used, making the apology feel reluctant and purely pragmatic; by failing to match declarations of guilt with the proper taking of responsibility, in particular through adequate compensation for Asian individuals who suffered from its atrocities; and, since 2001, by its prime minister's visits to the Yasukuni shrine, a private entity that honours war criminals as well as Japan's general war dead. Taken together, these failings weaken the government's claim that the nation is officially contrite, even if small groups of right-wingers are not.

If Japan's government were to launch efforts to deal with those three things, then the pluralism that, through those right-wingers, currently damages it would turn into a strength. Japan, unlike China, is a democratic and peaceful society in which disputes and even nasty debates can be handled safely. Japan poses no danger to its neighbours. Rather, another country is coming to resemble the Japan of the 1920s and 1930s: one that is developing rapidly, is hungry for energy and other natural resources, and whose nationalist politics sometimes spills worryingly into its streets. That country is China.

This does not mean that China looks poised to repeat Japan's ghastly 20th-century history. But it does mean that China, for all its new official mantra about its “peaceful rise”, is nevertheless the region's, and even the globe's, boat-rocker. Its past willingness to bind itself into global rule-based systems such as the WTO has been a welcome way to channel its growth. The country's new leadership needs to follow that same path: by adapting its currency system to reflect changing conditions, for example, and by seeking ways to defuse tensions with Japan, not to exploit them. The Japan question will fade. The China question is only going to get louder.