食事の後、彼女が自分を連れて行ったのは、チャイナタウンのフィリピーナ・パブ。「何で？」と思ったが、しこたまビールを飲んだ。帰りに１回、道でこけるほど酔っていた。
今日起きると、電源がＯＦＦになっているのにカメラのレンズが本体に納まりきれていないのを発見した。「Lens Error!」軽くレンズを叩くと納まって、ＯＮにできるが、ＯＦＦにするとまた「Lens Error!」のメッセージが現れる。レンズの中心が狂ったに違いない。どうしてかわからない……。お願いやから、壊れんといて！！
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LKY wrote about China and its leaders extensively. However, more interesting to me is his very critical view on Lee Teng-hui（李登輝）, who has been a strong advocate of the “Japanese way.”*
Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988…Vice-President Lee Teng-hui took over. I had met him first as mayor of Taipei, the as the governor of Taiwan province… He was competent, industrious and deferential to his superiors, especially the president and the mainlander ministers…
For a few years President Lee Teng-hui continued the KMT’s settled policy of one China and no independent Taiwan…
Once he had consolidated his position, President Lee began to express his feelings in words which caused the leaders in Beijing to conclude that he wanted to keep Taiwan separate from China for as long as possible. In 1992 President Lee announced his terms for reunification. He defined “one China” as the Republic of China, not as the People’s Republic of China. National reunification would only be achieved under a “free, prosperous and democratic China” – in other words, communist China must first become as democratic as Taiwan. I did not know then that this was intended as a fixed, unbridgeable position, not a starting point for negotiations.
In April 1994 President Lee gave an interview to Ryotaro Shiba… In it, he said the KMT was a party of outsiders, that the Taiwanese people had suffered greatly under the occupation of outsiders… and that “Difficulties will lie ahead of Moses and his people… ‘Exodus’ may be a kind of fit conclusion.” For a president of Taiwan to talk of Moses leading his people to the Promised Land was a statement China could not ignore.
I received President Lee in Singapore in 1989, the first visit by a Taiwanese president to Southeast Asia… [Although] we had not then established diplomatic relations with the PRC, I decided the protocol level would not be that of a head of state… [We] referred to him as President Lee “from Taiwan,” not “of Taiwan.” Nevertheless that visit raised his political profile in the region.
By preference, he proudly told me, he read four top Japanese newspapers every day and watched NHK TV by satellite from Tokyo. Even for books, he preferred to read Japanese translations rather than the English originals because he found them easier reading. Steeped as he was in Japanese history and culture, he did not think much of the mainland, either its history and culture or its present communist leaders, viewing them with the eyes of a Japanese-trained elite. He… publicly called [the mainland leaders] “blockhead,” “stupid” and “damaged brains.”
[Because] of Taiwan’s isolation, he could not understand why world leaders did not sympathise with Taiwan as the Japanese did. He considered Japan’s sympathy and support for Taiwan of great importance. He also believed that if he followed the prescriptions of American liberals and the US Congress for democracy and human rights, the United States would defend him against communist China.
I could not understand President Lee’s position. An old friend of his explained that… Lee… was also a devout Christian who would do God’s will at all costs, fired by the bushido spirit.
… I asked Premier Li Peng why he was so concerned that Lee Teng-hui wanted independence. Li Peng said they watched the whole video recording of Lee Teng-hui’s speech in Cornel. Lee did not refer at all to one China, but emphasised Taiwan, and called it the Republic of China on Taiwan. This conviction led in March 1996 to the most serious confrontation between the two sides since the 1958 crisis in Quemoy. The Chinese deployed troops and conducted military exercises in Fujian province opposite Taiwan, and fired missiles that landed in waters near Important seaports on Taiwan’s west coast.
Meanwhile, President Lee began to de-emphasise Taiwan’s Chineseness. From the end of the war in 1945 until the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, their schools and universities taught in the national language (Mandarin). Students learnt the history and geography of mainland China of which Taiwan was a province. Now, schools teach more of the history and geography of Taiwan…
During his 12 years as president, Lee voiced separatist sentiments that had lain formant in Taiwan. He underestimated the will of the leaders of and people of the Chinese mainland to keep Taiwan firmly in China’s fold. Lee’s policies could only prevail with the support of the United States. By acting as though such support would be forthcoming for all times, he led the people of Taiwan to believe that they did not need to negotiate seriously on Taiwan’s future with China’s leaders. His contribution to Taiwan’s future has been to turn the reunification issues into the most important item on Beijing’s agenda. (pp. 625-632)
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