Hawks Wins 7 Straight Games (in 1977) and MM on Nixon

ノムラさん、楽天が６連勝でさぞかしご機嫌なことでしょう。

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南海ホークスは昭和52年、４月２日から阪急と開幕３連戦（西宮）。開幕投手は山内新一と山田久志で、この試合、10回表に勝ち越すものの、その裏に２点を奪われサヨナラ負け（２－３）を喫する。翌日のダブルヘッダー第１試合は藤田学が完投で７－２、第２試合も金城基泰が完投して９－１と連勝。以降、10日のロッテ戦（大阪）まで７連勝する。藤田学はその後も勝ち続け、すべて完投で５連勝（して６連敗）することになる。（写真＝「はばたけホークス」第５号の表紙と昭和52年８月３日の阪急戦で10勝目を１－０の２安打完封で飾った藤田学。左はブレイザー・ヘッドコーチ、右は定岡智秋。カッコよすぎ！）

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うちで練習してもさほど近所迷惑にならないだろう三味線か中国横笛を習ってみたい。クラリネットかフルートでもいい。

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[Richard Nixon] met me in Singapore in 1967… He was a serious thinker, knowledgeable about Asia and the world… The Cultural Revolution was then at its height. He asked me what I thought was going on. As far as we could make out, Mao wanted to remake China… Even if all the books were burnt, the proverbs and sayings would survive in the folk memory of the people. Mao was doomed to fail.

Asked about US-China enmity, I said there was no natural or abiding source of enmity between China and the United States. China’s natural enemy was the Soviet Union with whom it shared a 4,000-mile boundary which had been shifted to China’s disadvantage in the last 100 years…

When we met in Washington in 1969, Nixon again questioned me on China. I gave him basically the same replies. I did not know then that his mind was already focused on China to improve American’s position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

The subject which took the most time was Vietnam… I sensed that he wanted to end the Vietnam War because of domestic opinion, but was not about to be the first American president to lose a war. He wanted an honourable exit.

I expressed my amazement at the Americans’ loss of confidence… Any withdrawal should be purposeful and gradual so that Vietnamese soldiers could take on more of the war… The solution was to get a group of committed South Vietnamese leaders to tackle the problems with the dedication and sense of purpose the Vietcong displayed… Hanoi was fighting the war in Washington and helped unwittingly by many in Congress, egged on by the media… He showed interest. He wanted reasons to believe it was possible. That cheered him.

When I next met Nixon on 5 November 1970, he appeared fatigued after a strenuous mid-term election campaign… I suggested that he open America’s doors and windows to China and begin trade on non-strategic goods. When two-thirds of the UN members supported China’s admission, the United States should not be seen to be blocking it… (pp. 514-517)

[In April 1973] Marshall Green, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, asked for my views on America’s China initiatives, meaning Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972. I said they could not be faulted except for the element of surprise. If it had been done with less surprise, the favourable results would have been even better. The surprise factor had planted apprehension in Japanese and Southeast Asian minds that big powers were prone to sudden policy switches which could leave them on the wrong side.

Green explained that the Japanese had great difficulty in keeping secrets; they said so themselves. He stressed that the new relationship with China had not changed America’s policy towards any other nation in the area. (p. 519)