「ハマス政府と接触、米が断絶を通達」（読売新聞）
「アメリカ政府がハマスと接触して、断絶を通達した」のではない。わかりにくい見出し。
Thursday, March 30, 2006
As a Country Matures...
国民への一時金支給や選挙区割りが発表され、総選挙が近い。この時期ばかりは、普段露出度の少ない野党が話題になる機会も増える。
国立大学（ＮＵＳ）で29日、450人以上の学生を聴衆にして政治フォーラムが開催された。もっとも大きな喝采を浴びたのは与党議員ではなく、20年以上も議席を維持しているシンガポール民主同盟のベテラン議員、チャム・シートン氏だったという。チャム議員は「一党政治の継続を望むのか」と問い、「有権者が望んでいるのは“与党内野党”ではなく本物の野党だ」と訴えた。
フォーラム終了後も30人ほどの学生は同議員を取り囲み、少なからず興奮した様子だったらしい。国が成熟すれば、意見は多様化する。今の学生世代が指導者となる20年後以降のこの国を想像してみたりする。
国立大学（ＮＵＳ）で29日、450人以上の学生を聴衆にして政治フォーラムが開催された。もっとも大きな喝采を浴びたのは与党議員ではなく、20年以上も議席を維持しているシンガポール民主同盟のベテラン議員、チャム・シートン氏だったという。チャム議員は「一党政治の継続を望むのか」と問い、「有権者が望んでいるのは“与党内野党”ではなく本物の野党だ」と訴えた。
フォーラム終了後も30人ほどの学生は同議員を取り囲み、少なからず興奮した様子だったらしい。国が成熟すれば、意見は多様化する。今の学生世代が指導者となる20年後以降のこの国を想像してみたりする。
Wednesday, March 29, 2006
More Strange Dreams
月曜日に買った「死は易きことなり：陸軍大将・山下奉文の決断」（太田尚樹）と「山下奉文：昭和の悲劇」（福田和也）のうち、「死は易きことなり」を終えた。その間、“The Psychology of Everyday Life” は中断した。ずっとこの本を読んでいたため、N さんからの仕事を始めていない……。
シンガポール「大検証」（華僑粛清）が、JB まで数十キロのクルアン（Keluang）で、つまりシンガポール上陸以前の１月末に下命されていたこと、また、例の「イエスかノーか」が英軍司令官パーシバル中将ではなく、通訳に対して発せられたものだったことは驚きだった。
先週金曜日。“Bridge” に行ったが翌日をムダにした。あそこに行くと酔ってもいないのに、帰宅が朝方になるせいかよくこういうことがある。そして、不思議な夢を連続してみた。
ゴキブリが這い回る家。気にしていそうにない親に文句を述べる。食事を作ろうとするが、パスタを入れたフライパンにまで１匹見つけて唖然とする。（川べりの？）細い道で、シンガポール人の友人がスーパーに夕食にする「横浜ラーメン」を買いに行くというので、いったん同じものを買ってきてもらうよう頼んだが、気が変わっていっしょに薬局に行ってもらうことにする。薬局ではゴキブリ退治のために除虫剤を買った。レジにいたのは日本語で「ありがとう」と言うインド系のおじさんだった。
小学校の近くにあった化粧品店に寄る。「ヘアリキッド」を買いに行った。店の人が「これしかありませんね」と示したのは資生堂の「ブラバス」だった。
大阪の工業地帯。学校がひとつあって、小泉首相が詰襟姿の学生で登場した。髪は黒かったようだ。親しい間柄らしく、「まだ２年目ですから」と自分に話していた。大阪であるにもかかわらず、「また上京してください」と言われ、別れた。この学校を出て、周辺の工場を見ながら歩く。道路を渡るためだけに、たまたま通りがかった車を止めて後部に座る。信号を渡ったところで礼を言い、降ろしてもらった。
シンガポール「大検証」（華僑粛清）が、JB まで数十キロのクルアン（Keluang）で、つまりシンガポール上陸以前の１月末に下命されていたこと、また、例の「イエスかノーか」が英軍司令官パーシバル中将ではなく、通訳に対して発せられたものだったことは驚きだった。
先週金曜日。“Bridge” に行ったが翌日をムダにした。あそこに行くと酔ってもいないのに、帰宅が朝方になるせいかよくこういうことがある。そして、不思議な夢を連続してみた。
ゴキブリが這い回る家。気にしていそうにない親に文句を述べる。食事を作ろうとするが、パスタを入れたフライパンにまで１匹見つけて唖然とする。（川べりの？）細い道で、シンガポール人の友人がスーパーに夕食にする「横浜ラーメン」を買いに行くというので、いったん同じものを買ってきてもらうよう頼んだが、気が変わっていっしょに薬局に行ってもらうことにする。薬局ではゴキブリ退治のために除虫剤を買った。レジにいたのは日本語で「ありがとう」と言うインド系のおじさんだった。
小学校の近くにあった化粧品店に寄る。「ヘアリキッド」を買いに行った。店の人が「これしかありませんね」と示したのは資生堂の「ブラバス」だった。
大阪の工業地帯。学校がひとつあって、小泉首相が詰襟姿の学生で登場した。髪は黒かったようだ。親しい間柄らしく、「まだ２年目ですから」と自分に話していた。大阪であるにもかかわらず、「また上京してください」と言われ、別れた。この学校を出て、周辺の工場を見ながら歩く。道路を渡るためだけに、たまたま通りがかった車を止めて後部に座る。信号を渡ったところで礼を言い、降ろしてもらった。
Thursday, March 23, 2006
Are You Telling Me the Truth?
また前日のことだが、保険金請求書を返送するとの連絡を、確か今月10日あたりにもらっていたが、さっぱり届かないので保険会社に電話してみた。「１週間ほど前にお送りしました」とのこと。国内ならもちろん、日本からでも１週間もかかるはずがない。キミ、ウソをついてるんじゃないの？そうでなかったら、途中で紛失したことになる。
今日、Q が来て夕食を作った。一体、どういう判断基準で来る日と来ない日、食事を作る日と作らない日を決めているのだろうか。自分の態度がぎこちないことに気づいている……。
漢字とかなを並べただけの「意味のない日本語」をプリントしたＴシャツを着ている人がいる。これもファッションのひとつ。しかし、歴史認識を誤っていると相変わらず批判される日本の、その歴史と深く関係するデザインがこの国でカジュアルに使われていると、話はちょっと複雑だ。
先週、日本ではめったに見ることがない「十六条旭日旗」を描いたバッグを持った人と、同じデザインの帽子をかぶった人を立て続けに目撃した。数年前、この旗をモチーフにした服で登場し、激しく非難された中国の女優がいたことを思い出した。
旭日旗は旧海軍のシンボルで、現在も海上自衛隊が使用していることを知らずのことだろうが、歴史を軽々しく扱うものだと思う。「旭日旗グッズ」で金儲けしているのは誰なのか？
From “Elusive Peace”:
DAY 9, 19 JULY 2000: … as Robert Malley recalls, ‘Arafat asked one more thing. He said, “Can I have a period where I will go and consult? Could we take a break? Could I consult with my Arab colleagues, because this goes way beyond my own prerogatives. We’re talking about Jerusalem.”’ But Clinton would not accept this, fearing that if people left the pressure cooker of Camp David the whole deal would be frittered away. The president also feared, as did Barak, that Arafat would simply pocket the offer and use it at a later stage to ask for more concessions. Clinton insisted on a straight yes or no then and there, and that Arafat should spell out whether he regarded the offer as a basis of concluding a final deal.
When this answer came it was a no, which was, as Sandy Berger recalls, ‘a very big setback for us’… (p. 110)
[Barak] needed Clinton to declare that all id4as presented at Camp David were null and void, and he asked for something more to show the Israelis what he had really won for his co-operative gestures: a new strategic upgrade of Israeli-American relations and a package of new military support to show that Camp David had not weakened Israel; the US embassy to be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, to show that Barak’s offer had strengthened, not weakened, the Israeli hold on Jerusalem; and a US commitment to fight a unilateral declaration of statehood by the Palestinians, including a guarantee of opposition to admission to the UN of that state if it was unilaterally declared. Ross promised to discuss these requests with Clinton.
DAY 15, 25 JULY 2000: [Martin] Indyk and [Aaron] Miller wanted the President not to take sides and not to blame either Arafat or Barak for the failure of the summit. Thus their statement was balanced and did not assign blame to either side. But, as he reviewed this statement over breakfast, Clinton rewrote some of the passages and at the press conference his pitch came from his heart. He said he had enormous respect for what Barak had done and the Israeli public should be proud of their Prime Minister. There was no similar praise for Arafat. (p. 120)
I (Jacques Chirac) would like to point out that no countries and no media subscribe to the Israeli version of events. The whole world shares the same feeling, even Mexico… [Ariel] Sharon provoked incidents and he did so with the consent of your government. The discrepancies have to be considered: sixty-four Palestinians and nine Israeli Arab dead, 2,300 Palestinians wounded, while, on the Israeli side, only two civilians and one soldier were killed. No one can believe that the Palestinians are to blame for this chain of violence. On the basis of my experience of guerilla warfare in Algeria, I know how to interpret this kind of imbalance… it’s up to Israel to make the first gesture.
To that long speech Barak replied by saying that ‘Arafat must not be rewarded for his bad behaviour.’ (p. 129)
今日、Q が来て夕食を作った。一体、どういう判断基準で来る日と来ない日、食事を作る日と作らない日を決めているのだろうか。自分の態度がぎこちないことに気づいている……。
漢字とかなを並べただけの「意味のない日本語」をプリントしたＴシャツを着ている人がいる。これもファッションのひとつ。しかし、歴史認識を誤っていると相変わらず批判される日本の、その歴史と深く関係するデザインがこの国でカジュアルに使われていると、話はちょっと複雑だ。
先週、日本ではめったに見ることがない「十六条旭日旗」を描いたバッグを持った人と、同じデザインの帽子をかぶった人を立て続けに目撃した。数年前、この旗をモチーフにした服で登場し、激しく非難された中国の女優がいたことを思い出した。
旭日旗は旧海軍のシンボルで、現在も海上自衛隊が使用していることを知らずのことだろうが、歴史を軽々しく扱うものだと思う。「旭日旗グッズ」で金儲けしているのは誰なのか？
From “Elusive Peace”:
DAY 9, 19 JULY 2000: … as Robert Malley recalls, ‘Arafat asked one more thing. He said, “Can I have a period where I will go and consult? Could we take a break? Could I consult with my Arab colleagues, because this goes way beyond my own prerogatives. We’re talking about Jerusalem.”’ But Clinton would not accept this, fearing that if people left the pressure cooker of Camp David the whole deal would be frittered away. The president also feared, as did Barak, that Arafat would simply pocket the offer and use it at a later stage to ask for more concessions. Clinton insisted on a straight yes or no then and there, and that Arafat should spell out whether he regarded the offer as a basis of concluding a final deal.
When this answer came it was a no, which was, as Sandy Berger recalls, ‘a very big setback for us’… (p. 110)
[Barak] needed Clinton to declare that all id4as presented at Camp David were null and void, and he asked for something more to show the Israelis what he had really won for his co-operative gestures: a new strategic upgrade of Israeli-American relations and a package of new military support to show that Camp David had not weakened Israel; the US embassy to be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, to show that Barak’s offer had strengthened, not weakened, the Israeli hold on Jerusalem; and a US commitment to fight a unilateral declaration of statehood by the Palestinians, including a guarantee of opposition to admission to the UN of that state if it was unilaterally declared. Ross promised to discuss these requests with Clinton.
DAY 15, 25 JULY 2000: [Martin] Indyk and [Aaron] Miller wanted the President not to take sides and not to blame either Arafat or Barak for the failure of the summit. Thus their statement was balanced and did not assign blame to either side. But, as he reviewed this statement over breakfast, Clinton rewrote some of the passages and at the press conference his pitch came from his heart. He said he had enormous respect for what Barak had done and the Israeli public should be proud of their Prime Minister. There was no similar praise for Arafat. (p. 120)
I (Jacques Chirac) would like to point out that no countries and no media subscribe to the Israeli version of events. The whole world shares the same feeling, even Mexico… [Ariel] Sharon provoked incidents and he did so with the consent of your government. The discrepancies have to be considered: sixty-four Palestinians and nine Israeli Arab dead, 2,300 Palestinians wounded, while, on the Israeli side, only two civilians and one soldier were killed. No one can believe that the Palestinians are to blame for this chain of violence. On the basis of my experience of guerilla warfare in Algeria, I know how to interpret this kind of imbalance… it’s up to Israel to make the first gesture.
To that long speech Barak replied by saying that ‘Arafat must not be rewarded for his bad behaviour.’ (p. 129)
Memory Loss...?
昨日（火曜日）の夕方、紀伊国屋に１時間ほどいた。歴史の書棚の前で、先週読み終えたばかりの「菊兵団 軍医のビルマ日記」にも記述のある「辻政信」参謀のことが急に思い浮かんだが、「辻政信」という名前がなかなか思い出せずに苦労した。ECT の結果、起こることのある記憶の喪失に加え、母親のことがあり、また直前まで立ち読みしていた雑誌に「若年性認知症」のことが載っていたので、あわてた。「辻政信」が入っている記憶の引き出しを突然見つけ、安心して店を出た。
Wednesday, March 22, 2006
Not Enough Time for Writing Here...
ベッドに入ってから先週金曜日の夜に買った「菊兵団 軍医のビルマ日記」を終えた。文章はよろしくなく、「方々の出版社」に断られたというのも納得。脱字や変換ミスが散見されるのも気になる。すぐに“The Psychology of Everyday Life” (Sigmund Freud) を始めたが、まだIntroduction を読んでいる段階。
半日しか仕事をしていないのに、ゆっくりここに書き込む時間がない。
半日しか仕事をしていないのに、ゆっくりここに書き込む時間がない。
Thursday, March 16, 2006
Back to Work. Q Is Unhappy
「外交常識に背く」中国が麻生外相の批判連発（読売新聞）
麻生外相の中国に関する発言などに、中国政府が反発するケースが目立っている。政府内では「外相発言の批判部分ばかりに注目して対立を深めていることは日中両国にとって不幸だ」（外務省幹部）と懸念する声があがっている。
麻生外相は１５日の参院予算委員会で、中国と北朝鮮の貿易量増大に関し、「（中国が北朝鮮を）助けているのではないか」と不快感を示し、中国側に説明を求めていると強調した。
これに対し、中国外務省の秦剛・副報道局長は１６日の記者会見で「中朝貿易について、日本が中国外務省に交渉で説明を求めてきた事実はないし、こ のようなことは認められない」と述べ、「日本外交当局の最高責任者が近ごろ、外交常識に背く言論を何度も発表しているのは、理解しがたい」と外相を批判し た。
秦（剛）副報道局長は１５日夜にも、外相が１３日付の米紙「ウォール・ストリート・ジャーナル」に寄稿した「日本は中国の民主的な将来を歓迎する」と題した論文を批判。「日本の外交当局の責任者が中国の政治体制にとやかく言うのは極めて不適切だ」とする声明を発表した。
今日から仕事に復帰。うれしい。
ビール飲んで帰宅。Qは不満そうで、いつ帰ったのかもわからなかった。自分が本当に助けが必要なとき、彼女は“Scary. I can’t cope (with your illness)” だ。 昨日から突然、夕食を作り始めた。理解できない。
麻生外相の中国に関する発言などに、中国政府が反発するケースが目立っている。政府内では「外相発言の批判部分ばかりに注目して対立を深めていることは日中両国にとって不幸だ」（外務省幹部）と懸念する声があがっている。
麻生外相は１５日の参院予算委員会で、中国と北朝鮮の貿易量増大に関し、「（中国が北朝鮮を）助けているのではないか」と不快感を示し、中国側に説明を求めていると強調した。
これに対し、中国外務省の秦剛・副報道局長は１６日の記者会見で「中朝貿易について、日本が中国外務省に交渉で説明を求めてきた事実はないし、こ のようなことは認められない」と述べ、「日本外交当局の最高責任者が近ごろ、外交常識に背く言論を何度も発表しているのは、理解しがたい」と外相を批判し た。
秦（剛）副報道局長は１５日夜にも、外相が１３日付の米紙「ウォール・ストリート・ジャーナル」に寄稿した「日本は中国の民主的な将来を歓迎する」と題した論文を批判。「日本の外交当局の責任者が中国の政治体制にとやかく言うのは極めて不適切だ」とする声明を発表した。
今日から仕事に復帰。うれしい。
ビール飲んで帰宅。Qは不満そうで、いつ帰ったのかもわからなかった。自分が本当に助けが必要なとき、彼女は“Scary. I can’t cope (with your illness)” だ。 昨日から突然、夕食を作り始めた。理解できない。
Wednesday, March 15, 2006
Rising Sun Flag, Machiavelli, Killing of Depressed Wife
今日の午後、CB で「十六条旭日旗」をデザインしたカバンを持っている学生らしき女性がいた。大の日本好きか無知かのどっちかだな。
Allen Lane だが、理想的と言ったが取り消した方がいいかもしれない。この人、たいしたマキアベリでもある。
介護殺人未遂：６６歳夫が６２歳妻の首絞める 名古屋（毎日新聞）
１５日午後４時４５分ごろ、名古屋市南区天白町３、無職、宮崎兼義容疑者（６６）の長女（４２）から「父が母を殺したらしい」と１１０番通報があ り、駆けつけた愛知県警南署が１階居間で倒れている女性を発見、病院に搬送したが、間もなく死亡した。同署は現場にいた女性の夫の宮崎容疑者を殺人未遂容 疑で現行犯逮捕した。宮崎容疑者は、うつ病で通院する妻を看病していたといい、同署は介護疲れが動機とみて今後、殺人容疑に切り替えて調べを進める。
調べでは、宮崎容疑者は同日午後４時ごろ、妻絹猪さん（６２）の首をひものようなもので絞めた疑い。その後、別居している長女に「妻を殺した」と電話し た。宮崎容疑者は絹猪さんと２人暮らし。絹猪さんは約１年前から通院していたが、看病のことで日ごろから絹猪さんと口論が絶えなかったという。調べに対 し、宮崎容疑者は「妻に薬を飲ませようとしたが言うことを聞かず、かっとなってやった」と供述しているという。
宮崎容疑者は妻の首を絞めた後、自身もかもいにロープをかけて自殺を図ったが、命に別条はないという。
まったく不幸なことだ……。
Allen Lane だが、理想的と言ったが取り消した方がいいかもしれない。この人、たいしたマキアベリでもある。
介護殺人未遂：６６歳夫が６２歳妻の首絞める 名古屋（毎日新聞）
１５日午後４時４５分ごろ、名古屋市南区天白町３、無職、宮崎兼義容疑者（６６）の長女（４２）から「父が母を殺したらしい」と１１０番通報があ り、駆けつけた愛知県警南署が１階居間で倒れている女性を発見、病院に搬送したが、間もなく死亡した。同署は現場にいた女性の夫の宮崎容疑者を殺人未遂容 疑で現行犯逮捕した。宮崎容疑者は、うつ病で通院する妻を看病していたといい、同署は介護疲れが動機とみて今後、殺人容疑に切り替えて調べを進める。
調べでは、宮崎容疑者は同日午後４時ごろ、妻絹猪さん（６２）の首をひものようなもので絞めた疑い。その後、別居している長女に「妻を殺した」と電話し た。宮崎容疑者は絹猪さんと２人暮らし。絹猪さんは約１年前から通院していたが、看病のことで日ごろから絹猪さんと口論が絶えなかったという。調べに対 し、宮崎容疑者は「妻に薬を飲ませようとしたが言うことを聞かず、かっとなってやった」と供述しているという。
宮崎容疑者は妻の首を絞めた後、自身もかもいにロープをかけて自殺を図ったが、命に別条はないという。
まったく不幸なことだ……。
Monday, March 13, 2006
I Was in Pyongyang!
土曜日。午前10時に起きた。午後、さっそく昼寝してしまった。
夢で平壌にいた。コンビニが１軒ある舗装された道路に立ち、他にも数人の日本人観光客がいた。前方には「山門」のような構造物があり、その向こうには薄いピンク色の霞がかかったような風景が広がっていた。どの建物もはっきりとは見えていなかった。
コンサート会場。何のコンサートなのかわからない。自分の持っているチケットには「VIP」と書かれていた。長くはないが、チケット確認の列があって、そこで（水曜日にしばらくぶりのSMS をくれた）Mlna に会った。彼女は「VIP」ではないらしく、一般用のチケットを持っていた。会場に入ると「将軍様」用の席も用意されており、自分たちはそこから数列舞台寄り、舞台から見ると右側になる席に座った。VIP 用の席だったのでMlna は気にしていたが、満席にはほど遠い状態だったので「心配ない」と話していた。
夜11時を過ぎてからCC に出かけた。そのあと行った“Bridge” は何度行ってもどうも落ち着かない。朝方帰宅し、１日をムダにしてしまった。日曜日の夢……。
“CNA” の番組で出ている女性の自宅アパート。（誰だかはっきりしない。）なぜそこに自分がいるのかは不明。中年のオーストラリア人女性２人にインタビューしている様子だった。撮影を終えると自分ひとりになってしまい、悪いとは思いながらもアパート内を見せてもらうことにした。インタビューが行われていた先はカーテンで仕切られていて、その向こう側にはベッドがふたつ１メートルほどの間隔を置いて並んでいた。コンピューターも１台置いてあって、使ってみたが、これが使いにくい。画面上に縦長のアイコンが無数にあり、そのそれぞれが幅数ミリしかなく、クリックしにくい。「保存」だけでも数個のアイコンがあって、どうやら言語別にアイコンが区別されているようだった。
部屋の左奥にドアがあった。開けてみると数本のパイプが走る制御室のようだった。緑色にペンキが塗られたボンベには、白色で目盛線と数字が書かれてあった。
場面はゴミゴミした列車の駅入口。階段を昇り終えたところで会ったのは、ASRN の元のオフィスがあったときにランチを食べていた食堂のJRY だった。階段横にはゴミ捨て用の「シューター」があって、「ここが（アパートの住人の）共同シューターか？」とたずねられた。「そうじゃない」と答えて、「また、あそこに来てね」と言うと、JRY は一瞬、怪訝そうな顔をしたあと、「わかった、わかった」と笑顔で言ってくれた。一体、「あそこ」とはどこか？？
DAY 8, 18 JULY 2000: … Barak… responded in a big way – shocking everyone, including the Americans. He me Clinton on the front balcony of Dogwood at 10.30 in the evening and, dismissing their note-takers, the Prime Minister and the President stayed alone.
Barak now produced exactly the sort of package the President was waiting for. He said he would insist on retaining not 10.5 per cent but only 9 per cent of West Bank land for Israeli settlements. The Palestinians would be given a 1 per cent swap in Gaza by way of compensation. The Palestinians would also get sovereignty over 85 per cent of the border with Jordan. In Jerusalem, seven out of the nine outer neighbourhoods would come under Palestinian sovereignty; in the inner neighbourhoods they would be in charge of planning and zoning; and in the Old City the Muslim and Christian Quarters would come under Palestinian sovereignty. Regarding the Temple Mount/Haram, the UN Security Council would pass a resolution to hand custodianship over it jointly to Palestine and Morocco, the Chair of the Jerusalem Committee (the higher Islamic commission in Jerusalem). On security, Barak, Israeli needs would be met and Israel would have control of the Jordan Valley for up to twelve years before turning it over to the Palestinians. There would be a ‘satisfactory solution’ to the refugee question. Barak asked Clinton to present the offer to Arafat as a US proposal which the President would try to extract from Barak, not as Barak’s idea.
This was a generous, even stunning, offer, at the heart of which was something that had never before been proposed by an Israeli prime minister – the partitioning of Jerusalem. What brought Barak to put that offer on the table is a mystery. Perhaps the pressure-cooker atmosphere worked on him. Or perhaps he was gambling that Arafat would reject the offer and reveal his true colour as a fanatic who had come to Camp David only squeeze concessions from Israel, not to strike a deal. As Barak said to Elusive Peace, ‘if… Arafat would not consider this [generous offer] an opening… refuses to move forward, that would mean that indeed… he looks like a fanatic… walks like a fanatic… quacks like a fanatic and he is probably a fanatic.’ (p. 107)
ディスカウントしていた“Black Hawk Down” のDVD を買ってきた。
夢で平壌にいた。コンビニが１軒ある舗装された道路に立ち、他にも数人の日本人観光客がいた。前方には「山門」のような構造物があり、その向こうには薄いピンク色の霞がかかったような風景が広がっていた。どの建物もはっきりとは見えていなかった。
コンサート会場。何のコンサートなのかわからない。自分の持っているチケットには「VIP」と書かれていた。長くはないが、チケット確認の列があって、そこで（水曜日にしばらくぶりのSMS をくれた）Mlna に会った。彼女は「VIP」ではないらしく、一般用のチケットを持っていた。会場に入ると「将軍様」用の席も用意されており、自分たちはそこから数列舞台寄り、舞台から見ると右側になる席に座った。VIP 用の席だったのでMlna は気にしていたが、満席にはほど遠い状態だったので「心配ない」と話していた。
夜11時を過ぎてからCC に出かけた。そのあと行った“Bridge” は何度行ってもどうも落ち着かない。朝方帰宅し、１日をムダにしてしまった。日曜日の夢……。
“CNA” の番組で出ている女性の自宅アパート。（誰だかはっきりしない。）なぜそこに自分がいるのかは不明。中年のオーストラリア人女性２人にインタビューしている様子だった。撮影を終えると自分ひとりになってしまい、悪いとは思いながらもアパート内を見せてもらうことにした。インタビューが行われていた先はカーテンで仕切られていて、その向こう側にはベッドがふたつ１メートルほどの間隔を置いて並んでいた。コンピューターも１台置いてあって、使ってみたが、これが使いにくい。画面上に縦長のアイコンが無数にあり、そのそれぞれが幅数ミリしかなく、クリックしにくい。「保存」だけでも数個のアイコンがあって、どうやら言語別にアイコンが区別されているようだった。
部屋の左奥にドアがあった。開けてみると数本のパイプが走る制御室のようだった。緑色にペンキが塗られたボンベには、白色で目盛線と数字が書かれてあった。
場面はゴミゴミした列車の駅入口。階段を昇り終えたところで会ったのは、ASRN の元のオフィスがあったときにランチを食べていた食堂のJRY だった。階段横にはゴミ捨て用の「シューター」があって、「ここが（アパートの住人の）共同シューターか？」とたずねられた。「そうじゃない」と答えて、「また、あそこに来てね」と言うと、JRY は一瞬、怪訝そうな顔をしたあと、「わかった、わかった」と笑顔で言ってくれた。一体、「あそこ」とはどこか？？
DAY 8, 18 JULY 2000: … Barak… responded in a big way – shocking everyone, including the Americans. He me Clinton on the front balcony of Dogwood at 10.30 in the evening and, dismissing their note-takers, the Prime Minister and the President stayed alone.
Barak now produced exactly the sort of package the President was waiting for. He said he would insist on retaining not 10.5 per cent but only 9 per cent of West Bank land for Israeli settlements. The Palestinians would be given a 1 per cent swap in Gaza by way of compensation. The Palestinians would also get sovereignty over 85 per cent of the border with Jordan. In Jerusalem, seven out of the nine outer neighbourhoods would come under Palestinian sovereignty; in the inner neighbourhoods they would be in charge of planning and zoning; and in the Old City the Muslim and Christian Quarters would come under Palestinian sovereignty. Regarding the Temple Mount/Haram, the UN Security Council would pass a resolution to hand custodianship over it jointly to Palestine and Morocco, the Chair of the Jerusalem Committee (the higher Islamic commission in Jerusalem). On security, Barak, Israeli needs would be met and Israel would have control of the Jordan Valley for up to twelve years before turning it over to the Palestinians. There would be a ‘satisfactory solution’ to the refugee question. Barak asked Clinton to present the offer to Arafat as a US proposal which the President would try to extract from Barak, not as Barak’s idea.
This was a generous, even stunning, offer, at the heart of which was something that had never before been proposed by an Israeli prime minister – the partitioning of Jerusalem. What brought Barak to put that offer on the table is a mystery. Perhaps the pressure-cooker atmosphere worked on him. Or perhaps he was gambling that Arafat would reject the offer and reveal his true colour as a fanatic who had come to Camp David only squeeze concessions from Israel, not to strike a deal. As Barak said to Elusive Peace, ‘if… Arafat would not consider this [generous offer] an opening… refuses to move forward, that would mean that indeed… he looks like a fanatic… walks like a fanatic… quacks like a fanatic and he is probably a fanatic.’ (p. 107)
ディスカウントしていた“Black Hawk Down” のDVD を買ってきた。
Saturday, March 11, 2006
Pointless to Fight Now Against Prejudice/Misunderstanding. Therefore Tremendous Fear
Dr からの手紙を持って、会社に行った。発病、再発の原因、症状、うつ病全般について議論するつもりもなく、また（ある程度の誤解を含んだ）一般的な話として納得せざるを得ない復職条件だと思う……。恐怖だ。
DAY 7, 17 JULY 2000: Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, a close associate of [Ehud Barak], said,
What is Jerusalem? Large chunks of today’s Jerusalem are not mine… The Israeli interest is to transfer as many Palestinians as possible to the Palestinian [Authority] and to remain with as few Arabs as possible under Israeli rule. Of course, we can’t give up sovereignty on Temple Mount. We can’t give that to Arafat, it’s the cradle of Jewish history, but [on the other hand] we mustn’t run Al-Aqsa. We have to find a way of giving the Palestinians a compound in the Muslim Quarter… if we don’t get form them [a declaration of] End of Conflict it would not be wise to sign an agreement. (p. 102)
… the paper was a retreat from some of the offers that Ben-Ami and Gilead Sher had made in the back channel. While the two had suggested Israel retained 10.5 per cent of the West Bank to preserve her large settlement blocks, Barak now said Israel must keep 11.3 per cent. And while in the back channel the Israelis had offered the Palestinians at least three Arab suburbs in East Jerusalem, Barak offered only one village. On almost every issue there was a retreat.
Forgetting (on purpose?) his promise that the back-channel negotiations were deniable and non-binding, [Clinton] lashed out at Barak: ‘This is not real… this is not serious. I went to Shepherdstown [the Israeli-Syrian summit in January 2000] and was told nothing by you for four days. I went to Geneva [to meet Assad in March 2000] and felt like a puppet doing your bidding.’… ‘I will not let it happen here. I will simply not do it.’ Robert Malley, note-taker of the meting, recalls how the President ‘exploded… and in language that I had not heard him use with Barak before, if with anyone… he said… “You’ve made me wait here for thirteen hours, and you come back with this? You go sell that to Arafat, if you want to. Don’t ask me to do it. I’m not going to do that…”’ In his memoirs President Clinton confirms this conversation… when he writes, ‘It was after midnight when Barak finally came to me with proposals. They were less than what Ben-Ami and Sher had already presented to the Palestinians. Ehud wanted me to present them to Arafat as US proposals. But I couldn’t do that. It would have been a disaster, and I told him so.’ (pp. 104-105)
DAY 7, 17 JULY 2000: Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, a close associate of [Ehud Barak], said,
What is Jerusalem? Large chunks of today’s Jerusalem are not mine… The Israeli interest is to transfer as many Palestinians as possible to the Palestinian [Authority] and to remain with as few Arabs as possible under Israeli rule. Of course, we can’t give up sovereignty on Temple Mount. We can’t give that to Arafat, it’s the cradle of Jewish history, but [on the other hand] we mustn’t run Al-Aqsa. We have to find a way of giving the Palestinians a compound in the Muslim Quarter… if we don’t get form them [a declaration of] End of Conflict it would not be wise to sign an agreement. (p. 102)
… the paper was a retreat from some of the offers that Ben-Ami and Gilead Sher had made in the back channel. While the two had suggested Israel retained 10.5 per cent of the West Bank to preserve her large settlement blocks, Barak now said Israel must keep 11.3 per cent. And while in the back channel the Israelis had offered the Palestinians at least three Arab suburbs in East Jerusalem, Barak offered only one village. On almost every issue there was a retreat.
Forgetting (on purpose?) his promise that the back-channel negotiations were deniable and non-binding, [Clinton] lashed out at Barak: ‘This is not real… this is not serious. I went to Shepherdstown [the Israeli-Syrian summit in January 2000] and was told nothing by you for four days. I went to Geneva [to meet Assad in March 2000] and felt like a puppet doing your bidding.’… ‘I will not let it happen here. I will simply not do it.’ Robert Malley, note-taker of the meting, recalls how the President ‘exploded… and in language that I had not heard him use with Barak before, if with anyone… he said… “You’ve made me wait here for thirteen hours, and you come back with this? You go sell that to Arafat, if you want to. Don’t ask me to do it. I’m not going to do that…”’ In his memoirs President Clinton confirms this conversation… when he writes, ‘It was after midnight when Barak finally came to me with proposals. They were less than what Ben-Ami and Sher had already presented to the Palestinians. Ehud wanted me to present them to Arafat as US proposals. But I couldn’t do that. It would have been a disaster, and I told him so.’ (pp. 104-105)
Friday, March 10, 2006
Allen Lane, an Ideal
“Elusive Peace” を終える前から“Penguin Special: The Life and Times of Allen Lane” (Jeremy Lewis) を読み始めている。“Penguin Books” の出版を始めた人の話だが、最初、読みにくかった。第２次大戦が近づくあたりから、E.H. Carr, George Orwell, Arthur Koestler などの名前が出てきておもしろくなってきた。酒場やパーティーが付いて回る人だが、仕事へのエネルギーもすごい。こういう人が理想なんだが。
Thursday, March 09, 2006
"Ativan," When and How Many?
昨夜、２時を過ぎても眠れなかったので、半分に割った“Ativan” を飲んだ。午後、起きてからも眠くてたまらなかった。何時にどれだけ飲めばいいのか、いまだにわからない。今日もさっき1.5 錠飲んだ。
Able To Sleep, If Nothing Else. And This Is GOOD
添付されていないと思った領収書はMt. E の大きな領収書の裏に隠れていた。よかった。
先週の木曜日、クリニックに行って、「“Ativan” を２錠にしてもいい」と言われたので、そうしてみた。案外、すぐに眠れた。それだけはなく、「眠りすぎ」かと思うほどだったので、翌日から1.5 錠にした。以降、朝まで眠れないということがなくなった。少ない方がいいことに間違いないので、今日から１錠に戻してみた。眠れないようなら、後で0.5 錠追加する。
DAY 6, 16 JULY 2000: At one point the Israelis suggested having a fund that would be used to compensate both Palestinian refugees and the Jewish settlers who would be removed from occupied territories. Saeb Erekat exploded at [Gilead] Sher:
No sir, you are not going to be compensated for your years of occupation. We will demand compensation for every day of your occupation if you’re going down to this line. Somebody who has occupied me for thirty-five years and then comes to ask me for compensation? You took my childhood. I was twelve years old when your occupation came to my home town Jericho. I was never again the same person. You have denied me the right to live normally for thirty-five years. And now you wan compensation for this! I will calculate every hour, and find every legal way to make you pay for every damn hour, killing, bulldozing of homes, confiscating of land, closing schools, deporting, wounding, killing… (p. 97)
Clinton said to Arafat: ‘all the good things and all the suggestions [in the back channel] came from the Israelis… Your team sat there doing nothing.’ Robert Malley, there taking notes, recalls how Clinton told Arafat how disappointed he was that Arafat was not giving anything. With his voice rising, Clinton continued, ‘You haven’t moved one inch, whereas Barak is moving. And you haven’t done a thing… You’re now wasting this opportunity.’ At first Arafat was dismissive, playing down what was achieved in the night’s discussions. He said that that 89.5 per cent of territory offered by Gilead Sher and Shlomo Ben-Ami in the back channel for a Palestinian state, with sovereignty in several outer neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem and an independent border with Jordan, were, Arafat put it to Clinton, ‘less than Rabin offered’, and that ‘Rabin promised me ninety per cent [of land].’ This is sheer nonsense, as Clinton knew very well, and so he lashed out at Arafat. ‘We can all go home and I will say [that Barak] negotiated seriously and you did not.’ (p. 99)
先週の木曜日、クリニックに行って、「“Ativan” を２錠にしてもいい」と言われたので、そうしてみた。案外、すぐに眠れた。それだけはなく、「眠りすぎ」かと思うほどだったので、翌日から1.5 錠にした。以降、朝まで眠れないということがなくなった。少ない方がいいことに間違いないので、今日から１錠に戻してみた。眠れないようなら、後で0.5 錠追加する。
DAY 6, 16 JULY 2000: At one point the Israelis suggested having a fund that would be used to compensate both Palestinian refugees and the Jewish settlers who would be removed from occupied territories. Saeb Erekat exploded at [Gilead] Sher:
No sir, you are not going to be compensated for your years of occupation. We will demand compensation for every day of your occupation if you’re going down to this line. Somebody who has occupied me for thirty-five years and then comes to ask me for compensation? You took my childhood. I was twelve years old when your occupation came to my home town Jericho. I was never again the same person. You have denied me the right to live normally for thirty-five years. And now you wan compensation for this! I will calculate every hour, and find every legal way to make you pay for every damn hour, killing, bulldozing of homes, confiscating of land, closing schools, deporting, wounding, killing… (p. 97)
Clinton said to Arafat: ‘all the good things and all the suggestions [in the back channel] came from the Israelis… Your team sat there doing nothing.’ Robert Malley, there taking notes, recalls how Clinton told Arafat how disappointed he was that Arafat was not giving anything. With his voice rising, Clinton continued, ‘You haven’t moved one inch, whereas Barak is moving. And you haven’t done a thing… You’re now wasting this opportunity.’ At first Arafat was dismissive, playing down what was achieved in the night’s discussions. He said that that 89.5 per cent of territory offered by Gilead Sher and Shlomo Ben-Ami in the back channel for a Palestinian state, with sovereignty in several outer neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem and an independent border with Jordan, were, Arafat put it to Clinton, ‘less than Rabin offered’, and that ‘Rabin promised me ninety per cent [of land].’ This is sheer nonsense, as Clinton knew very well, and so he lashed out at Arafat. ‘We can all go home and I will say [that Barak] negotiated seriously and you did not.’ (p. 99)
Wednesday, March 08, 2006
Hamas PM-designate, Assassination Target
Mofaz: Hamas PM Could Be Israeli Target
Mar 7, 4:10 AM EST
JERUSALEM (AP) -- Israel's defense minister said Tuesday that the Islamic militant Hamas group's prime minister-designate, Ismail Haniyeh, is not immune from an Israeli targeted killing.
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz told Israel's Army Radio that Israel's policy of pinpointed killings has proven to be effective, and will continue.
"There is no question about its efficacy," Mofaz said. "Look what happened to Hamas in the years it conducted an untrammeled suicide bombing war against us. When we started the targeted killings, the situation changed."
"We will continue the targeted killings at this pace," he added. "No one will be immune."
Hamas, the militant Islamic group sworn to Israel's destruction, swept January parliamentary elections and is in the process of forming a Cabinet. It has rejected international calls to renounce its violent and anti-Israel ideology, but has maintained a year-old moratorium on suicide bombings.
Asked if Hamas' prime minister-designate would be a target if Hamas were to resume its attacks on Israel, Mofaz responded: "If Hamas, a terror organization that doesn't recognize agreements with us and isn't willing to renounce violence, presents us with the challenge of having to confront a terror organization, then no one there will be immune. Not just Ismail Haniyeh. No one will be immune."
Salah al-Bardawil, a Hamas spokesman, denounced Mofaz's comments.
"This statement and Israeli practices on the ground reflect the bloody, inhumane and inflammatory character of the Zionist enemy," al-Bardawil said. "We are not seeking immunity or mercy from Israel. We are in a confrontation. The side that is most steadfast is the side that will survive."
On Monday, two Islamic Jihad militants and three Palestinian bystanders were killed in an Israeli pinpoint attack in Gaza City. Two of those killed were children.
The Economist (March 4)
[Brazilian president Luiz inácio] Lula [de Silva] recounts how he once questioned China’s president Hu Jintao, about his opposition to a permanent seat for Japan [on the UN Security Council], one obstacle to reform. “We can’t allow the problems of the last century to influence decisions that will affect future centuries,” he told Mr Hu.
Estonia and Latvia [issued] declarations underlining their status as occupied territories during the Soviet era. Russia contests that view, insisting the Baltics joined the Soviet Union legally… Most west European countries… think [Estonia and Latvia] are being neurotic, and should shut up about the past.
Hmmmmm… Try to replace “Estonia and Latvia” with “Korea”…
From “Elusive Peace”:
CAMP DAVID TALKS, DAY 3, 13 JULY 2000: When the President (Clinton) explained to Arafat what was in the paper he was at first satisfied, but not for long. After seeing the President, Arafat immediately summoned his advisers… As Arafat started to read from the draft document the mood among the Palestinians changed dramatically. Saeb Erekat recalls, ‘When I translated to [Arafat] what it said about Jerusalem… he was extremely upset. President Arafat took the paper out of my hand, threw it in the air and said, “This is a non-starter.” I told you it was a set-up for us.’ What so upset Arafat was the fact that the new American paper made reference to Israel’s plan to expand Jerusalem so that Arafat could establish the Palestinian capital in an outlying neighbourhood instead of within the city’s traditional boundaries. (p. 90)
DAY 5, 15 JULY 2000: … General Shlomo Yanai offered a map showing the West Bank as Israel envisioned it in a future Palestinian state. But Abu Ala rejected the map out of hand, refusing even to look at it until Israel accepted the ‘principle’ that any territorial agreement had to be based on the lines of 4 July 1967… Clinton then blew up at Abu Ala:
OK, we know that you think that your position is that you should get the 1967 line. We agree that’s your position. And let’s assume that the Israelis accept it. Now draw me a line [on the map] of the kind of things you could accept, what percentage of land could you accept [to be annexed by Israel so that large Jewish settlements could be included in Israeli proper]?
But Abu Ala still would not look at the map… Clinton burst out again at Abu Ala: ‘OK you don’t like the map, but it’s an Israeli proposal and either you get specific about what you need to change or offer you own map… You’re not here to posture. I invited you here for a summit. I’m doing this for your sake, all you can do is come back with posturing. This is not a negotiation. This is a joke.’ (pp. 93-94)
会社に「顔を出せた」。それだけで満足。
保険金請求の書類も届いたが、領収書が添付されていない……。
Mar 7, 4:10 AM EST
JERUSALEM (AP) -- Israel's defense minister said Tuesday that the Islamic militant Hamas group's prime minister-designate, Ismail Haniyeh, is not immune from an Israeli targeted killing.
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz told Israel's Army Radio that Israel's policy of pinpointed killings has proven to be effective, and will continue.
"There is no question about its efficacy," Mofaz said. "Look what happened to Hamas in the years it conducted an untrammeled suicide bombing war against us. When we started the targeted killings, the situation changed."
"We will continue the targeted killings at this pace," he added. "No one will be immune."
Hamas, the militant Islamic group sworn to Israel's destruction, swept January parliamentary elections and is in the process of forming a Cabinet. It has rejected international calls to renounce its violent and anti-Israel ideology, but has maintained a year-old moratorium on suicide bombings.
Asked if Hamas' prime minister-designate would be a target if Hamas were to resume its attacks on Israel, Mofaz responded: "If Hamas, a terror organization that doesn't recognize agreements with us and isn't willing to renounce violence, presents us with the challenge of having to confront a terror organization, then no one there will be immune. Not just Ismail Haniyeh. No one will be immune."
Salah al-Bardawil, a Hamas spokesman, denounced Mofaz's comments.
"This statement and Israeli practices on the ground reflect the bloody, inhumane and inflammatory character of the Zionist enemy," al-Bardawil said. "We are not seeking immunity or mercy from Israel. We are in a confrontation. The side that is most steadfast is the side that will survive."
On Monday, two Islamic Jihad militants and three Palestinian bystanders were killed in an Israeli pinpoint attack in Gaza City. Two of those killed were children.
The Economist (March 4)
[Brazilian president Luiz inácio] Lula [de Silva] recounts how he once questioned China’s president Hu Jintao, about his opposition to a permanent seat for Japan [on the UN Security Council], one obstacle to reform. “We can’t allow the problems of the last century to influence decisions that will affect future centuries,” he told Mr Hu.
Estonia and Latvia [issued] declarations underlining their status as occupied territories during the Soviet era. Russia contests that view, insisting the Baltics joined the Soviet Union legally… Most west European countries… think [Estonia and Latvia] are being neurotic, and should shut up about the past.
Hmmmmm… Try to replace “Estonia and Latvia” with “Korea”…
From “Elusive Peace”:
CAMP DAVID TALKS, DAY 3, 13 JULY 2000: When the President (Clinton) explained to Arafat what was in the paper he was at first satisfied, but not for long. After seeing the President, Arafat immediately summoned his advisers… As Arafat started to read from the draft document the mood among the Palestinians changed dramatically. Saeb Erekat recalls, ‘When I translated to [Arafat] what it said about Jerusalem… he was extremely upset. President Arafat took the paper out of my hand, threw it in the air and said, “This is a non-starter.” I told you it was a set-up for us.’ What so upset Arafat was the fact that the new American paper made reference to Israel’s plan to expand Jerusalem so that Arafat could establish the Palestinian capital in an outlying neighbourhood instead of within the city’s traditional boundaries. (p. 90)
DAY 5, 15 JULY 2000: … General Shlomo Yanai offered a map showing the West Bank as Israel envisioned it in a future Palestinian state. But Abu Ala rejected the map out of hand, refusing even to look at it until Israel accepted the ‘principle’ that any territorial agreement had to be based on the lines of 4 July 1967… Clinton then blew up at Abu Ala:
OK, we know that you think that your position is that you should get the 1967 line. We agree that’s your position. And let’s assume that the Israelis accept it. Now draw me a line [on the map] of the kind of things you could accept, what percentage of land could you accept [to be annexed by Israel so that large Jewish settlements could be included in Israeli proper]?
But Abu Ala still would not look at the map… Clinton burst out again at Abu Ala: ‘OK you don’t like the map, but it’s an Israeli proposal and either you get specific about what you need to change or offer you own map… You’re not here to posture. I invited you here for a summit. I’m doing this for your sake, all you can do is come back with posturing. This is not a negotiation. This is a joke.’ (pp. 93-94)
会社に「顔を出せた」。それだけで満足。
保険金請求の書類も届いたが、領収書が添付されていない……。
Tuesday, March 07, 2006
Body Aches!
“Elusive Peace” を読み終えた。Abbas (Abu Mazen) が首相に就任してからのArafat は、権限を維持することに必死だったようだ。老害の始まりだ。出版以後、交渉にはさっぱり進展が見られず、今やSharon は昏睡状態が続き、一方Hamas は議席の過半数を占める。
At first, when the march [of hundreds of Lebanese] began, the Israelis attempted to stop the marchers by firing over their heads and into the crowds, killing more than ten. This stopped the march, but upset international opinion. The dilemma before Prime Minister Barak, as explained to him by the military, was as follows: ‘Either we start a big military operation to reverse the situation and capture the southern Lebanese army outposts… or we understand that this is the new reality… and [we] carry out the withdrawal quicker than we had planned.’ Realizing that the game was up, Barak picked up the phone to tell American and UN officials that he would be out of Lebanon ‘within twenty hours’. To the military he said: “Withdraw!’ By 24 May 2000, there were no more Israeli troops in Lebanon. (P. 76)
… President Clinton went to see the Prime Minister, who had already devised a complete script for the [Camp David] summit a la Barak. He told Clinton that nothing substantial should happen during the first two days of the summit in order to demonstrate to sceptical Israelis and Palestinians back home that things were not easy, that tough negotiations were under way and that their respective leaders were working hard and not giving up on vital interests. Was Barak so naïve as to think that, even without wasting two days, the negotiations would not be tough enough? (p. 87)
ジムに行った。常にどこかの筋肉が痛い……。「高いカネ出して、何でこんなつらいことをせにゃならんのか？」という誰かの意見ももっともらしいが、多少の達成感が得られるという事実のほうが重要だと今は思う。
At first, when the march [of hundreds of Lebanese] began, the Israelis attempted to stop the marchers by firing over their heads and into the crowds, killing more than ten. This stopped the march, but upset international opinion. The dilemma before Prime Minister Barak, as explained to him by the military, was as follows: ‘Either we start a big military operation to reverse the situation and capture the southern Lebanese army outposts… or we understand that this is the new reality… and [we] carry out the withdrawal quicker than we had planned.’ Realizing that the game was up, Barak picked up the phone to tell American and UN officials that he would be out of Lebanon ‘within twenty hours’. To the military he said: “Withdraw!’ By 24 May 2000, there were no more Israeli troops in Lebanon. (P. 76)
… President Clinton went to see the Prime Minister, who had already devised a complete script for the [Camp David] summit a la Barak. He told Clinton that nothing substantial should happen during the first two days of the summit in order to demonstrate to sceptical Israelis and Palestinians back home that things were not easy, that tough negotiations were under way and that their respective leaders were working hard and not giving up on vital interests. Was Barak so naïve as to think that, even without wasting two days, the negotiations would not be tough enough? (p. 87)
ジムに行った。常にどこかの筋肉が痛い……。「高いカネ出して、何でこんなつらいことをせにゃならんのか？」という誰かの意見ももっともらしいが、多少の達成感が得られるという事実のほうが重要だと今は思う。
Monday, March 06, 2006
Proper Language, Please
ワールド・ベースボール・クラシック（WBC）の記事：
序盤に失点も、試合の流れを呼び込んだ救援陣の好投もあった。金寅植監督も「（勝因は）何よりも投手たちの好投」と称えていた。（日刊スポーツ）
「“投”手たちの好“投”」って……。
序盤に失点も、試合の流れを呼び込んだ救援陣の好投もあった。金寅植監督も「（勝因は）何よりも投手たちの好投」と称えていた。（日刊スポーツ）
「“投”手たちの好“投”」って……。
Wednesday, March 01, 2006
Q's Head Consumed with a Big Xmas Gift
Qはこのアパートを売却してもっと広い場所を買うことを決めて以来、引越しのことしか頭にない。他に話すことがないようだ。クリスマス・プレゼントを待つ子供と同じ。次の場所に同時に移るのは、申し訳ないが彼女と住みたいことが理由ではなく、住む場所が必要だからだ。風水による方角がどうだとか、近所の住人がどうだとか、うるさいにもほどがある。
起床時間は、
昨日：午後１時
今日：午前11時半
From “Elusive Peace”:
The summit at Wye [in October 1998] was not just intended to facilitate implementation of previous agreements, however. It was also – and this fact has never before been published – the climax of an Israeli-Palestinian plot to impose a deal on Prime Minister Netanyahu, and, should he fail to play ball, to out him.
Netanyahu was despised not only by Palestinians, who regarded him as an obstacle to peace, but also by the Israeli Left. Hence, in the period just before Wye, senior politicians from the Israeli opposition, including Yossi Beilin and Chaim Ramon, put their heads together with leading Palestinians, such as Saeb Erekat, Abu Mazen (also known as Mahmoud Abbas), Hassan Asfour and Mohammed Dahlan… Erekat recalls these meetings as, ‘collusion between me and members of the Israeli opposition… a cabal of me and my Israeli sympathizers… We developed certain ideas about how to deal with Netanyahu and we contacted the Americans with it and gave them something.’…
In other words, a secret draft was put together behind the back of the Prime Minister by the Israeli opposition and the Palestinians, in co-ordination with the Americans. This draft was then presented as an ‘American paper’ to Netanyahu and Arafat, becoming the basis for negotiations at Wye. (pp. xxvi-xxvii)
Renegotiating Wye [in July 1999] had put an enormous strain on the already bumpy relationship between Barak and Arafat. Although Barak insisted that ‘I’ve never humiliated Arafat’, he did actually often hurt the easy-to-be-offended Palestinian leader. This was nothing particular to do with Arafat, but more with the sort of arrogant behaviour typical of Barak. He was equally ready to humiliate and hector his own colleagues and friends. The fact that he was poor at managing other people’s sensitivities in a part of the world where honour, dignity and respect form an important component of the diplomatic game was a major problem. (p. 17)
[A former head of Military Intelligence Uri] Saguie recalls, ‘The Syrian said [during the September 24, 1999, peace talks], “We are looking for you Israelis to give up the entire Golan Heights down to the 4 June lines,” I said to them, “Could you show me the 4 June line on the map? Can you explain to me what do you mean when you refer to the 4 June line?”’ This was a legitimate question. The 4 June 1967 line had never actually been drawn on any map. It was not a line but a concept – Assad’s notion of the deployment on the ground as it existed prior to the 1967 war. According to Saguie, the Syrians replied, ‘We mean the positions where you Israelis were deployed before the war.’ Saguie:
I brought with me a map. A Syrian map! They looked at it. The [1923] international border was there. But there was no 4 June line. So they changed tactics. They said ‘If you show us our [military] positions before the war then…’ So I did and I showed them that sixty per cent of their positions were in fact east of the 1923 line… Then they told me, ‘But we controlled this area by fire… from a distance… even if we were not there physically.’ So I told them: “I control Damascus by my aeroplanes, so is it mine?” (p. 24)
Syria-First, in the view of those who opposed the strategy, meant that if Assad was offered 100 per cent of land taken from him, Arafat would also insist on 100 per cent, something the Israelis would find it impossible to offer. “No Palestinian leader’, Aaron Miller [a State Department expert] explains, ‘would be able to demonstrate any flexibility after the Israelis were prepared to give Assad 100 per cent of the Golan.’ Also, those in the American Administration who objected to a Syria-First strategy felt that it could poison the already suspicious atmosphere between the Palestinians and the Israelis, as the Palestinians would feel left behind. (p. 27)
Just a day before the talks were due to open in Washington [in December 1999],… Barak told Dennis Ross that because of his trouble at home he wished the coming summit at Blair House to focus only on ‘procedural’ matters and to avoid ‘substantial’ ones. He also said he did not want to meet the Syrian Foreign Minister [Farouk al-Shara] face to face lest Shara demand that Barak reaffirm the Rabin ‘deposit’ and promise to withdraw fully from the Golan Heights down to the 4 June 1967 lines. ‘Prime Minister,’ said a stunned Ross, ‘you are the one who insisted that we must move quickly… We have high-level discussions for the first time and you don’t want to discuss [matters of] substances or meet privately Shara. (pp. 34-35)
… there was still no progress on substance [during the January, 2000, peace talks in Shepherdstown, West Virginia]. The feeling among the Syrians, and indeed Americans, was that Prime Minister Barak was the main obstacle. He was not helpful, not allowing his negotiators any leeway and not compromising at all. (p. 45)
In an interview for Elusive Peace, US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger recalls how ‘how Barak told us that he didn’t intend to make any movement [at the January 2000 talks]… that he couldn’t seem to appear to be moving too quickly. That didn’t please [President Clinton] very much.’ Indeed, it was all becoming an embarrassing and depressing situation. A summit that Barak himself had called for, and been the driving force behind, had now been scuttled by himself. (p. 47)
起床時間は、
昨日：午後１時
今日：午前11時半
From “Elusive Peace”:
The summit at Wye [in October 1998] was not just intended to facilitate implementation of previous agreements, however. It was also – and this fact has never before been published – the climax of an Israeli-Palestinian plot to impose a deal on Prime Minister Netanyahu, and, should he fail to play ball, to out him.
Netanyahu was despised not only by Palestinians, who regarded him as an obstacle to peace, but also by the Israeli Left. Hence, in the period just before Wye, senior politicians from the Israeli opposition, including Yossi Beilin and Chaim Ramon, put their heads together with leading Palestinians, such as Saeb Erekat, Abu Mazen (also known as Mahmoud Abbas), Hassan Asfour and Mohammed Dahlan… Erekat recalls these meetings as, ‘collusion between me and members of the Israeli opposition… a cabal of me and my Israeli sympathizers… We developed certain ideas about how to deal with Netanyahu and we contacted the Americans with it and gave them something.’…
In other words, a secret draft was put together behind the back of the Prime Minister by the Israeli opposition and the Palestinians, in co-ordination with the Americans. This draft was then presented as an ‘American paper’ to Netanyahu and Arafat, becoming the basis for negotiations at Wye. (pp. xxvi-xxvii)
Renegotiating Wye [in July 1999] had put an enormous strain on the already bumpy relationship between Barak and Arafat. Although Barak insisted that ‘I’ve never humiliated Arafat’, he did actually often hurt the easy-to-be-offended Palestinian leader. This was nothing particular to do with Arafat, but more with the sort of arrogant behaviour typical of Barak. He was equally ready to humiliate and hector his own colleagues and friends. The fact that he was poor at managing other people’s sensitivities in a part of the world where honour, dignity and respect form an important component of the diplomatic game was a major problem. (p. 17)
[A former head of Military Intelligence Uri] Saguie recalls, ‘The Syrian said [during the September 24, 1999, peace talks], “We are looking for you Israelis to give up the entire Golan Heights down to the 4 June lines,” I said to them, “Could you show me the 4 June line on the map? Can you explain to me what do you mean when you refer to the 4 June line?”’ This was a legitimate question. The 4 June 1967 line had never actually been drawn on any map. It was not a line but a concept – Assad’s notion of the deployment on the ground as it existed prior to the 1967 war. According to Saguie, the Syrians replied, ‘We mean the positions where you Israelis were deployed before the war.’ Saguie:
I brought with me a map. A Syrian map! They looked at it. The [1923] international border was there. But there was no 4 June line. So they changed tactics. They said ‘If you show us our [military] positions before the war then…’ So I did and I showed them that sixty per cent of their positions were in fact east of the 1923 line… Then they told me, ‘But we controlled this area by fire… from a distance… even if we were not there physically.’ So I told them: “I control Damascus by my aeroplanes, so is it mine?” (p. 24)
Syria-First, in the view of those who opposed the strategy, meant that if Assad was offered 100 per cent of land taken from him, Arafat would also insist on 100 per cent, something the Israelis would find it impossible to offer. “No Palestinian leader’, Aaron Miller [a State Department expert] explains, ‘would be able to demonstrate any flexibility after the Israelis were prepared to give Assad 100 per cent of the Golan.’ Also, those in the American Administration who objected to a Syria-First strategy felt that it could poison the already suspicious atmosphere between the Palestinians and the Israelis, as the Palestinians would feel left behind. (p. 27)
Just a day before the talks were due to open in Washington [in December 1999],… Barak told Dennis Ross that because of his trouble at home he wished the coming summit at Blair House to focus only on ‘procedural’ matters and to avoid ‘substantial’ ones. He also said he did not want to meet the Syrian Foreign Minister [Farouk al-Shara] face to face lest Shara demand that Barak reaffirm the Rabin ‘deposit’ and promise to withdraw fully from the Golan Heights down to the 4 June 1967 lines. ‘Prime Minister,’ said a stunned Ross, ‘you are the one who insisted that we must move quickly… We have high-level discussions for the first time and you don’t want to discuss [matters of] substances or meet privately Shara. (pp. 34-35)
… there was still no progress on substance [during the January, 2000, peace talks in Shepherdstown, West Virginia]. The feeling among the Syrians, and indeed Americans, was that Prime Minister Barak was the main obstacle. He was not helpful, not allowing his negotiators any leeway and not compromising at all. (p. 45)
In an interview for Elusive Peace, US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger recalls how ‘how Barak told us that he didn’t intend to make any movement [at the January 2000 talks]… that he couldn’t seem to appear to be moving too quickly. That didn’t please [President Clinton] very much.’ Indeed, it was all becoming an embarrassing and depressing situation. A summit that Barak himself had called for, and been the driving force behind, had now been scuttled by himself. (p. 47)
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