Practicum Evaluation, Mistaken Visa Expiry Date, "BlueWave" Lives on in JB, and MM on Vietnam

今日（金曜日）、またビザの切れる日だと心の底から「信じて」、急いでお願いした滞在延長申請の手紙を受け取りに東の端っこまで行った。手紙とともに授業実習の評価ももらった。日本人のこの自分が、英語で英語の授業をした結果。十分満足すべき評価だと思った。

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そのまま、Woodlandsに行く。出国印を見て、１週間間違えていたことに初めて気づいた。アホ。まぁ、１週間「早く」間違えていてよかったと自分をなぐさめた。

Johor Bahruで、「（オリックス）ブルーウェーブ」が生き続けていることを確認した。

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The Vietnamese cunningly exploited the fears and desires of the countries of Asean that wanted to befriend them… [Their leaders] were filled with their own importance, and prided themselves as the Prussians of Southeast Asia. True, they had suffered, taken all the punishment that American technology had inflicted on them, and… defeated the Americans… For us, the puny states of Southeast Asia, they had nothing but contempt… Their newspapers criticised the existence of US military bases in the Philippines and Thailand and spoke of collusive relations between China and Singapore.

By 1976 deepening disagreements with China made them despatch diplomatic missions to Asean… [The deputy foreign minister, Phan Hien] said [in July 1976] Vietnam was non-interventionist in other countries’ affairs. He drew a distinction between the people of Vietnam and the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The people of Vietnam supported the just cause of the peoples of Southeast Asia fighting for independence, meaning the communist insurgency. The government wanted to establish bilateral relations with these countries. I pointed out that this diplomatic sophistry could not erase questions in our minds that this dual track was interference… Differences between Asean countries were resolved within Asean so neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could exploit them. (pp. 347-348)

… [Prime Minister Pham Van Dong] came on 16 October 1978. I found him arrogant and objectionable... In discussions lasting two and a half hours, we dispensed with courtesies and euphemisms. Indeed, our forthright conversation had started in the car journey from the airport.

I began by welcoming Vietnam’s desire to work together with us for peace, stability and prosperity, but… [t]hey are unfriendly, even threatening… Dong declared… Vietnam had to contribute to the cause of revolution and peace in Southeast Asia and the world. This should not be of concern to Singapore. Vietnam was… a brave nation, intelligent and rich in natural resources. Both the United States and Japan had told Vietnamese that their country would become economically a strong country, and that, the United States and Japan, would need economic and trade relations with it.

[H]e claimed that Beijing had instigated 140,000 to 150,000 ethnic Chinese in the north to leave Vietnam and return to China across the border. They could not understand why. The root cause was [after Vietnam’s victory over the Americans]… China had continued its expansionist policy against Vietnam. Beijing had made use of Khmer leaders to launch attacks into Vietnamese territory to commit atrocious crimes… The overseas Chinese had always been attached to their fatherland… Beijing had exploited such sentiments.

I asked whether China would have the same policy in Singapore if it had an embassy here. He did not think it would because it did not want to bring all the overseas Chinese. It was better to leave them where they were, to use them as instruments. Looking at me pointedly, he said that ethnic Chinese everywhere would support China, just as ethnic Vietnamese abroad would support Vietnam. (pp. 348-349)