Did Haniya Say So or Didn't He?

[Mr Haniya] told reporters the subject of recognising Israel had not come up in the interview [by the Washington Post]. (BBC)

“Arafat: The Biography” (Tony Walker/Andrew Gowers) を終了。同名DVD の関連本、“Elusive Peace” (Ahron Bregman) を買った。

As Marwan Kanafani, Arafat’s press spokesman at the time and sometime confidant, observed of an early meeting with [Shimon] Peres: ‘We realized the size of the catastrophe when we met Peres for the first time (after Rabin’s death) and came to the conclusion he did not have the leadership qualities to go forward.’  (p. 385)

… while Palestinian leaders in their Gaza redoubt were quietly satisfied that they had seen the back for the moment of Netanyahu whom they had come to despise, there were few illusions about [Ehud] Barak, an unknown quantity politically.  Arafat and his colleagues could not put out of their minds that it was Barak, the military man, who had led elite Israeli commandos on a raid of Beirut in 1973, to avenge the Munich Olympic Games massacre, in which a troika of the PLO’s most promising cadres were assassinated.  (pp. 403-404)  

… while they (Arafat, Nabil Shaath and Madeleine Albright) were cooling their heels [at the Waldorf Astoria in New York in September 2000, waiting to see Clinton], Albright, according to Shaath, asked Arafat, ‘What are you going to tell the President of the United States about the Temple Mount?’

Arafat: ‘What I tell the President of the United States is none of your business.  By the way, it is not the Temple Mount, it is the Haram al-Sharif.’

Albright: ‘I know it as the Temple Mount.’

Arafat: ‘It’s the Haram al-Sharif.’

Albright: ‘OK, it’s the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.’

Arafat: ‘No, it’s the Haram al-Sharif.’

Albright: ‘OK, call it what you wish.  Are you going to accept the proposal made by the President of the United States about shared sovereignty [for the holy places]?’

At that moment, an enraged Arafat walked out, saying, ‘You know nothing about the history of the place… You are delaying the meeting with the President of the United States.’  (p. 415)

Arafat was able to draw some satisfaction on 24 January 2002 from the death of Lebanese militia warlord Elie Hobeika who was blown up in a massive car bomb outside his house.  It was Hobeika who had commanded the Phalange militia units which were responsible for the 1982 massacre at Sabra and Shatila.  No culprit for Hobeika’s elimination was identified but one intriguing possibility suggested itself: the Lebanese warlord would have been a material witness at the possible trial of Ariel Sharon in a Belgian war crimes case over the  Sabra and Shatila massacre.  Now he had been silenced.  (p. 428)

… the Palestinian leader is full of anger against the Americans whom he blames for many of his ills, including his present marginalization.  He is incensed that the George W. Bush mantra of ‘regime change’ extends to the Palestinians.  He is deeply resentful that he received most of the blame for the failure of Camp David when he believes that inadequate preparation by the Americans and a cheeseparing attitude by Ehud Barak made these other parties at least as culpable.  (p. 440)