Tuesday, March 25, 2008

Strange Dreams and MM on Thailand

断片的でしかないけど、またヘンな夢を見始めた。この数日の間に、大型犬が自分との別れを惜しんでいる夢、手続きすることを忘れて、6万円以上の還付金を受け取る機会を逃した夢、大地震に遭遇した夢などなど。

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先週、プロ野球パリーグが開幕した。人気でセリーグに劣るパが少しでも注目度を上げようとして両リーグ同時開幕をやめてから久しい。パリーグの開幕シリーズと同時期にセリーグがやってることは、米レッドソックスとアスレチックスを招いてのプレシーズン試合。これでは両リーグが足並み揃えたプロ野球人気の向上など、あり得ない。

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I met Prime Minister Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn in Bangkok in 1966…

He lamented the fact that the Americans were fighting with one hand tied behind their backs; they attacked North Vietnam only by air and fought a defensive war in South Vietnam, a no-win strategy. All they could hope for was not to lose. The Thais were adjusting to new reality. (pp. 329-330)

As a formulator of policy, Kukrit [Pramoj, who became prime minister in 1975] worried me. I visited him in Bangkok on 17 April 1975, a week after the Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Penh and two weeks before Saigon fell. He did not have much to say about Thailand’s position… Kukrit said the US bases should go within a year. He was no longer sure of the United States, and their pressure, being more of a “target” than a “deterrent”, compromised and embarrassed Thailand… Singapore’s view was that the presence of the US Seventh Fleet made our relations with China and the Soviet Union easier…. When the Soviets wanted Singapore to allow them to store oil for their fishing fleet on one of our outer islands, we had told them to buy from the American oil companies in Singapore. If there were no Seventh Fleet, we would not be able to give them such a reply. (p. 331)

I asked why Radio Hanoi was so hostile towards Thailand when their government was extending the hand of friendship. Their tactics, Kukrit said, were to coerce and frighten the Thais into establishing diplomatic relations, and they wanted the world to see that Thailand was frightened. He described his meeting with the leaders of the North Vietnamese delegation to Bangkok:… he “shivered in the embrace”. (pp. 331-332)

Our relations with the Thais became closer after the Vietnamese attacked Cambodia in December 1978. General Kriangsak, the Thai prime minister then, had no experience in foreign affairs…

He had placed all his bets on the Chinese. When Deng Xiaoping visited Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore in November 1978,… Kriangsak’s welcome was the warmest… If China allowed the Vietnamese a free hand in Cambodia, Kriangsak and Thailand would be in peril. Deng looked grim when I described the consequences that would follow if Thailand switched sides believing that the Soviet Union was going to prevail in Southeast Asia. (pp. 333-334)

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